



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Should UN Expel Aggressors?

by Henry Steele Commager

Mr. Henry Hazlitt, a contributing editor to *Newsweek* magazine, has recently proposed in *The New York Times*, of November 16, that we insure the integrity and dignity of the United Nations Organization by the simple expedient of expelling aggressor nations. This is not a new idea, nor wholly irrelevant; it is plausible and, at first sight, persuasive. After all, the UN Charter extends membership to "peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter," and after all, too, the Charter itself provides for both suspension and expulsion of nations which "persistently violate" its principles. The legal right to expel wicked nations is therefore clear enough. And quite aside from the legal situation, what a ravishing prospect opens up before us if we but take this course—a world organization made up exclusively of nations and peoples dedicated to peace and to law, an organization of the saved, not the damned.

Yet a moment's reflection suggests difficulties. This glittering formula, far from being a solution of our present problems, would be merely an aggravation of them. For we must ask ourselves at the very outset the most ele-

mentary of questions: Suppose this policy were possible; what would be its consequences? It is the failure to consider consequences that is, perhaps, the most serious fault in political thinking, and it is a fault in which Americans (so George F. Kennan tells us) are peculiarly prone—possibly because they have so often in the past found it easy to avoid consequences in world affairs.

We ask ourselves, then, the most practical of questions: If we succeed in expelling aggressor nations, what could the United Nations do that it cannot do now? Could it save Hungary from Russian aggression if Russia were out of the UN? Could it solve the Middle Eastern crisis if Israel were to be branded an aggressor nation and expelled or—what is quite as logical—if Egypt were to be branded an aggressor and expelled?

Lincoln faced an analogous problem in 1861 when Southern states, dissatisfied with the prospect before them, withdrew from the Union. "Can strangers make treaties easier than friends can make laws?" he asked with characteristic reasonableness, and the question is as pertinent today as it was a century ago. Can we bring outcast nations to reason?

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more easily than we can consult within the family of nations? The experience of the League of Nations with Italy, Germany and Japan should give us pause.

But this practical consideration is merely the first and most elementary of our difficulties. A more serious difficulty confronts those who would expel the wicked and cleave to the virtuous—the danger of disintegrating the United Nations itself. Almost all Americans would agree in branding Russia an aggressor nation, and there would be widespread support for this view throughout the globe. We might assume, then, that Russia could be expelled, and the prospect of a UN without Russia is a tempting one.

Who Would Be Left?

But what of Britain and France? Four Asian nations—India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon—have already, on November 14, branded them aggressors. Suppose they had not withdrawn their forces from Egypt or now withdraw too slowly. Are we to brand them as aggressors and expel them? With Russia, Britain, France and Communist China out of the UN, the United States would be the only great power left. Perhaps—who knows—it would be our turn next. Certainly a combination of Asian nations disturbed by our Far Eastern policy, of Latin American nations jealous of our hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, and of Communist nations sworn to hostility is not outside the realm of possibility.

This is clearly a dangerous game, this game of expelling aggressors, for once it gets under way it will end by destroying the UN itself. The way to preserve an organization is not by breaking it up, no matter how serious the provocation or, superficially, how tempting the immediate advantages. Surely we would regard as mad anyone who seriously suggested that because Alabama and Georgia refused to abide by the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court they should be expelled from the Union.

As long as a nation is a member of the UN it is subject to the innumerable pressures and conditions of membership. There are the practical conditions of membership in a score of useful subsidiary international organizations. There are legal restraints—far from negligible as recent events have proved. There is an opportunity to carry on educational work in the UN organization itself. For example, wouldn't it be a pity if we had expelled Poland and Hungary in years past? And there are moral restraints, impalpable but powerful. These operate best within the arena of the United Nations. They cannot operate effectively without the United Nations.

Moral Superiority Not Certain

There is a final consideration that should not be ignored and that concerns, particularly, ourselves. That is the psychological or moral aspect of the position recommended by Mr. Hazlitt. The habit of dividing the world between the saved and the

damned, and unhesitatingly putting ourselves in the first category and others in the second, is as dangerous for a group as it is for an individual. In the individual it leads to pride and arrogance; in a group or a nation it may lead to a display of moral superiority which will inevitably antagonize and outrage peoples beyond the pale.

And, moreover, it is wholly unrealistic. That in a given situation—such as the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops—the Russians are aggressors and we are “peace-loving” is crystal clear. But few situations in international relations are quite this clear, and it is significant that India has distinguished between Russian aggression and British, and condemned the British more severely. That in a more complex situation, such as the Israeli invasion of Egypt and the Anglo-French attack on the Suez Canal, we share with others ultimate responsibility and ultimate guilt is clear. That, in fact, every nation, like every individual, bears some of the guilt of a troubled world is a lesson that moralists and philosophers have preached for 2,000 years. Even those nations or individuals reluctant to accept their share of responsibility or of guilt should be willing to concede that it is neither wholesome nor admirable to be certain of their moral superiority.

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What U.S. Policy for Europe?

The keystone of American postwar foreign policy and the core of its defense strategy is our alliance with Western Europe. Will this continue to be the case?

The Marshall Plan and NATO are proof that Western Europe lies within America's defense perimeter. Fifteen billion dollars and five divisions should make it clear to anyone, even the Russians, that Washington is tied to Western Europe for better or worse.

Yet it is no secret, although not widely recognized, that within the past few years, but particularly within the past few months, this supposedly hard core of American foreign policy and defense strategy has begun rusting away. The Administration will not admit this; but a score of foreign missions in Washington fear it, and each week more and more of the nation's leading columnists and commentators discuss it.

Officially the Western alliance, particularly our relationship with Britain and France, remains the keystone of American policy. Vice President Richard M. Nixon, addressing the National Automobile Show dinner in New York on December 6, declared that Suez bygones must be bygones and that the United States must repair its ties with Britain and France.

President Eisenhower said on November 27 that the Suez crisis had not weakened or disrupted the British-French-United States alliance or NATO. And on November 14 he had stated: "Our friendships with these two countries are going to be stronger than ever." No one could ask for more hopeful, more encouraging words. But more is necessary

if the West is to continue its common course which so far has held the Russian bear at bay.

Unease About U. S. Policy

In some quarters — diplomatic, journalistic, even official — the disturbing thought is gaining ground that the United States is shifting its policy from dependence on Western unity and strength as the cornerstone of its security to reliance on the United Nations to maintain peace and freedom. The President has not said so; the Administration has not redefined American policy in any such way; but the impression persists here that the White House is, in fact, imperceptibly but decisively altering the scope of American policy.

When you find such diverse commentators as James Reston of *The New York Times*, the Alsop brothers of the *New York Herald Tribune*, and George Sokolsky of *King Features*, all within days seriously questioning the vitality of the Western alliance there must be some official fire behind all this journalistic smoke. The Alsops suggest that the question is not "whether we wish to conserve the alliance; the question is rather whether we shall be able to conserve the alliance." Mr. Reston notes "a change" in American attitudes toward the Western alliance. And Mr. Sokolsky says flatly that the Western alliance "is now very sick and may die."

While the President, the Vice President and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles are all concerned about the effect of the Suez crisis on Western Europe, the White House is acting cautiously toward our two Western allies. For example, Sir An-

thony Eden sought to visit Washington on his way home from Jamaica, but President Eisenhower decided to wait until after the first of the year before considering a conference with the British and French.

What Washington's allies fear is not that President Eisenhower will drag the Western coalition into a war but that NATO's ex-commander in chief will unilaterally and thoroughly renounce the use of force to settle international disputes in such a way that military alliances will become meaningless. What our allies fear now is not United States militancy but United States pacifism.

The European members of NATO, in the absence of a clear decision on Europe by Washington, ask anxiously: Where is America's defense perimeter today? It has hitherto been assumed that this perimeter included Western Europe. It has also been widely assumed that the United States could not permit the U.S.S.R. to attain a foothold in the Mediterranean or the Middle East. The Truman Doctrine, the Greek-Turkish aid program, were all designed to block Soviet expansion eastward and southward. But the President has publicly renounced the use of force in the Middle East as well as in Central Europe.

The net result is that United States ties with Western Europe, but more particularly with Britain and France, have touched a postwar low. Will the Paris NATO conference of December 11 check this process?

NEAL STANFORD

(The second in a series of eight articles on "Decisions . . . 1957," a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



What Kind of Peace Settlement for Middle East?

by Philip S. Bernstein

Rabbi Bernstein of Temple B'rith Kodesh, Rochester, New York, is chairman of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs, and served as president of the Central Conference of American Rabbis from 1950 to 1952. His book, *What the Jews Believe*, is now in its tenth edition.

AT THIS juncture of history Middle East problems must be viewed on two levels. The first is rational, logical by objective standards. The other is in the realm of power politics, which has a logic of its own.

On the level of reason and justice, the basis for settlement is clear. It should include the following specific elements:

What Should Be Done for Israel?

1. The acceptance by President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Arab associates of Israel's right to exist. Israel was established by the United Nations. It has become an important member of the family of nations and is increasingly involved in world affairs. It has made indisputably clear its will and capacity to exist. Only the Arab nations refuse to face this fact. They announce and act on their determination to destroy Israel, thus making peace on any basis impossible. Therefore, the first step in any permanent settlement is for the UN to get Nasser to accept Israel's right to be.

2. Other steps should logically follow this. Acceptance of Israel should mean the end of harassment and incitement. Israel has endured eight years of murder and pillage, of harrowing anxiety. This harassment was incited and executed by the Arab leaders, especially Colonel Nasser. There is a limit to the patience of a people thus put upon, as the United States itself demonstrated when President Wilson sent an expeditionary force, under the command of

General Pershing, into Mexico in 1916. In such circumstances the basic responsibilities lie with the source of the provocation. Colonel Nasser and the other Arab leaders should be directed by the UN to cease and desist from what is in effect a constant state of war upon Israel.

3. Stoppage of harassment should include the economic war also. The Arab states have boycotted Israel in order to strangle it. Not only have they refused to buy from or sell to Israelis, but they have threatened to boycott every firm from whatever country which does business with Israel. They have even carried this boycott to the point of threatening foreign firms with Jewish employees or directors. Apart from the disastrous effects on the Arabs themselves, who would greatly profit from Jewish products and markets, this is a form of economic warfare and must be stopped if there is to be peace.

Suez Settlement

4. The Suez issue thus becomes the touchstone of a peace settlement. As an instrument of economic warfare, Egypt closed the canal to all shipping to and from Israel. This was done in open violation of a UN resolution. Consequently, when Nasser nationalized the canal the precedent had already been established of the arbitrary, willful closing of it to the shipping of nations in his disfavor despite international law and commitments. The British and French saw this, as they had failed to see the portent of Hitler's seizure of the Ruhr in 1936, and so they

acted in understandable self-interest after despairing of firm action by the United States. There is no solution of this problem short of international control of the canal, insulating it from the caprices of Egyptian politics and guaranteeing equal rights to the shipping of all nations.

5. On the other side much can be and should be done for the Arabs. The refugees should be settled in Arab lands among people with similar religion, language and way of life. It is fruitless now to reargue the original causes of their plight. The pressing obligation is their resettlement without delay, not in tiny Israel, itself crowded with more than a million Jewish refugees—most of them in recent years from Arab countries—but among their own. This obvious solution was rejected by the Arab leaders, who used the refugees as a weapon in their war on Israel. If the war is to end, the refugee problem must be ended. The resources of the UN, the United States and other Western powers, as well as aid from other Arab countries and Israel, should be made available.

Economic Aid to Arabs

6. Substantial economic aid should be given to all Middle East countries ready to make peace. The real problem of the Arab peoples is not Israel but their own poverty. Nasser has mortgaged the Egyptian economy for Communist arms. Arab leadership should now be encouraged to act in such a way as to induce the West to offer substantial economic

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by John B. Christopher

Dr. Christopher, associate professor of history at the University of Rochester, is coauthor of *A History of Civilization* and spent the academic year 1955-1956 traveling and doing research in the Middle East on a fellowship from the Fund for the Advancement of Education, visiting Israel, Egypt and the Arab countries.

RABBI Bernstein stresses the urgent problems requiring immediate solution in order to achieve a Middle Eastern settlement. This article is focused on two important human problems that must be solved in order to achieve a lasting pacification of the Middle East. These are the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees and the allegiance of Arab intellectuals.

Refugee Problem

It would be hard to exaggerate the central significance of the nearly one million refugees from Palestine as a factor in Arab-Israeli tension. Certainly they are more important than questions of unsettled frontiers and economic boycotts. To the Arabs the refugees, many of whom are living on the margin of subsistence in wretched camps, are the symbol of a grave injustice. Nursing grievances with great tenacity, easily aroused by political leaders and demagogues, the refugees constitute a grave threat to the tranquillity of the Arab states themselves. During the riots in Jordan a year ago the refugees attacked not only foreign consulates but also projects designed for their own assistance — Point Four installations, enterprises of American religious groups, and even the splendid experimental farm at Jericho run by Musa 'Alami, himself a Palestinian and a refugee.

Many experts agree that it is economically possible to improve the status of the refugees by such projects as the Eric Johnston plan for joint utilization of the Jordan River by Israel and Jordan to irrigate

new lands. Moreover, it is argued, both Syria and Iraq, unlike overpopulated Egypt and Lebanon, are truly underdeveloped countries and could in the near future support larger populations than they now do. They could provide permanent homes for refugees now living in camps close to the frontiers of Israel.

What Israel Can Do

The difficulties in the way of settlement are political. Neither Israel nor the Arab states have so far shown any willingness to take measures easing the refugee problem or looking toward its ultimate solution. It has often been suggested, however, that Israeli compensation to the Palestinian Arabs for their lost property and an Israeli offer to repatriate at least a token number of refugees would be useful initial steps. Such steps might help in the important matter of saving "face" for the refugees, who apparently believe that the events accompanying partition greatly impaired their prestige. They would also indicate that the Israelis assume part of the responsibility for the hardships sustained by the Palestinian Arabs.

On the Arab side the difficulties are even more formidable. Both the Palestinians and the Arab governments have steadily resisted anything that suggests permanent resettlement. Proposals like the Johnston plan have aroused violent opposition because they would involve cooperation between Arabs and Israelis. Even some of the temporary relief measures sponsored by UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and

Works Agency) — replacing tent camps with more substantial quarters, for example — have aroused Arab criticism. Arab policy seems to be based on the premise that the Israelis will soon be "pushed into the sea" and the whole refugee question automatically resolved thereby. In short, a revolutionary change in both Israeli and Arab policies is required.

Role of Arab Intellectuals

Yet in the long run perhaps the most explosive element in Arab society is not the refugee population but the intellectuals, that is, teachers, students, lawyers, journalists and government employees. These intellectuals play a more important part in shaping public opinion in the immature nationalisms of the Middle East than do their counterparts in the West. They are men who feel themselves the natural leaders of their countries but are frustrated by the entrenchment of traditional ruling groups in positions of power. Their frustration is further aggravated because they are in a sense educated beyond the social and economic capacities of their countries to absorb them.

These intellectuals are often rabid nationalists, Western-educated yet most hostile to Western colonialism, real or imaginary. It is to this group, and not to the authentic proletariat, that communism in the Middle East makes its potential appeal. The intellectuals sometimes regard the Soviet Union not as a new imperial master but rather as a welcome ally against old imperial enemies.

Nasserism Gaining

In Arab countries like Iraq which are still semifeudal in organization the intellectuals admire Nasser because he has defied the West and, in their eyes, has played power politics in the authentic style of a major

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Bernstein

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assistance, including the building of the Aswan Dam.

7. Another touchstone is the Jordan water project worked out by Eric Johnston. This is good for everybody. It will provide more water for Arabs and Israelis, and more and cheaper light and power. The plan was rejected by the Arab governments because its acceptance, they felt, would be a recognition of Israel's right to exist. When they are ready for peace, the Jordan plan can be implemented for the benefit of all.

8. Other adjustments can be made, amicably, whenever the Arabs display the will to peace. Israel will not return to the boundaries and armistice lines which the Arabs repudiated by their invasion and continuing harassment. But mutually beneficial border adjustments can be arranged, by direct negotiations between the parties at a peace table. Israel has no designs on the territory of Egypt. The Gaza Strip, however, is part of Palestine, not Egypt. Once the refugees are resettled, it will have little real value or integral relationship to Egypt and is militarily indefensible.

Middle East Realities

The above represents a rational basis for resolving the Middle East conflict. But what are the realities? Colonel Nasser is still in the saddle, and more intransigent than ever. The Russians do not want the Middle East problem solved, for in their view peace and economic stability are obstacles to the spread of communism, and they are behaving accordingly. They continue to incite and arm the Arabs and threaten the West. They use the UN for their ends but circumvent or repudiate the international forum when it suits their purposes. The United States has acted with high intentions, but

with a wisdom yet to be confirmed by events. For in a power struggle—and that is the sad but ineluctable fact—our government, by its intervention, has weakened its allies and strengthened the enemies of the West.

What U.S. Can Do

This is what the United States can do:

A. Insist upon direct Arab-Israel negotiations as the best and only method of securing a dependable peace.

B. Cease to appease Nasser, and act realistically toward Nasserism as the Middle East equivalent to Hitlerism.

C. Re-establish the Western alliance, which, in the face of Russia's penetration of the Middle East at Nasser's invitation, is more necessary than ever.

D. Offer a defense alliance to Israel, the only Middle East country unequivocally committed to the West and militarily strong.

The clouds are dark upon the horizon, and no one knows when they will lift. Perhaps not until East and West come to terms, whenever that will be. Meanwhile the Arab and Israeli peoples, who have so much to give each other, are the tragic victims of forces irrelevant to their own needs and aspirations.

Christopher

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power. They admire him also because of his attack on traditional Egyptian corruption and of his promises to purify and modernize Egyptian society. Half the discontented journalists and politicians of the Arab world seem to have cast themselves in the role of potential Nassers for their own states. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that some form of Nasserism is likely to be a long-term feature of the Arab political scene.

Will the United States be able to arrest the present drift of Arab intellectuals toward a kind of diplomatic and economic fellow-traveling? Probably the most we can hope for is that the new Nassers of the Arab world will follow the example of the great anticolonialist power India and adopt a neutral policy like that of Nehru.

In any case, it is evident that the issues at stake in the Middle East, as in the case of the Palestinian refugees, are not just the relatively simple ones of economic aid and development but the more baffling ones of deeply felt political attitudes and prejudices. The basic requisites for a lasting Middle Eastern settlement are not so much economic as political—even, in essence, psychological.

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U.S. Stakes Future on UN

The dramatic coincidence of the crises in Egypt and Hungary has produced an also dramatic change in the direction followed by United States foreign policy since the end of World War II. During the past decade this country, not without reluctance, had assumed the leadership of the free world in the global struggle against communism, had spearheaded defensive coalitions outside the United Nations, and had deprecated, if not actually denounced, "neutralism." On October 31 President Eisenhower, in his broadcast to the nation on the two crises, set American policy on a new course.

Since then this country has parted company with our principal free-world allies, Britain and France, on the Middle East; has thrown its moral support behind the United Nations; and has not only welcomed but sought the advice of the leading neutralist nation, India, as well as of other neutralists of Asia and Africa, in the fulfillment of its new policy. This policy stresses two features earnestly favored by neutralist leaders: opposition to colonialism, traditionally supported by the American republic but soft-pedaled during the past decade out of deference to our European allies; and determination to avoid resort to force, with reliance now placed on moral suasion backed by defensive preparations rather than on reference to massive retaliation.

First Fruits

The first fruits of this new policy, of which President Eisenhower assumed personal charge during the illness of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, became rapidly apparent. The

concept of a United Nations police force, envisaged by the UN's Charter but not yet implemented by its member nations, was given concrete form in a matter of days with the arrival of a modest contingent of under 100 soldiers contributed by Denmark and Norway at the war-wrecked airfield of Abu Suweir. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, after obtaining a unanimous vote of confidence from the UN following Anglo-French-Israeli attacks on Egypt, which had caused him to consider resignation from his post, personally supervised the launching of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), requested and obtained a \$10 million appropriation for the UN's share of expenditures of this force, expected to number eventually 6,000, and started to organize salvage operations for clearing the Suez Canal, whose total cost is estimated at \$40 million.

Throughout the complex negotiations, fraught with pitfalls, which if not overcome could provoke new threats of war, Mr. Hammarskjöld has sought to do three things: (1) to reconcile UN operations with the sovereignty of the country on whose territory they are taking place — Egypt; (2) to bring the moral force of world opinion, as reflected in the UN General Assembly, to bear on the great powers involved—Britain and France in Egypt, the U.S.S.R. in Hungary; and (3) to draw on nations other than the great powers for the soldiers and technicians requested by the UN.

Thus in a piecemeal way, with much creaking and fumbling, the machinery needed to meet the most primitive requirements of the world

community is beginning to emerge. This is the way the bare mechanics of fitting unruly princes and barons with clashing interests into the framework of the nation-state must have looked at the end of the feudal period in Western Europe.

Role of UN

Now that the United States has staked its future on the UN, and before our present enthusiasm for international cooperation is allowed to be tarnished by disillusionment, it would be wise to bear three things in mind:

First, the UN as such (this cannot be repeated too often) has no entity or powers of its own. If it is to become the effective force for peace which Washington apparently hopes it can prove to be, all its members will have to put a measure — how great it is still too early to say — of their authority and resources at its disposal for common purposes. And every member nation, whether great or small, whether armed with nuclear weapons or bow and arrow, will have to accept the same treatment at the hands of the UN that it wants the UN to mete out to its opponent.

Country A cannot demand encroachments in behalf of its interests on the sovereignty of country B, and then refuse to let the UN scrutinize its affairs when its own policy is protested by country C. As President Eisenhower well said on October 31, there cannot be two codes of international conduct, one for our friends and one for our opponents. A generally accepted code of international morality adapted to the conditions of the nuclear age—no matter how modest its initial level—has

to be evolved, otherwise the UN will simply become a jungle with each member acting as its own judge and executioner against any nation or group of nations which it believes to be threatening its interests—and invoking the name of the UN to justify its national designs.

Next Steps

The United States has taken an important step toward the establishment of such rules of conduct by its dissociation from the Anglo-French action at Suez. It has thereby earned the praise of British Labor party leader Hugh Gaitskell, who said on November 25 that the United States, "alone of the great powers, has clean hands in this business"; and has gained the confidence of Arab states, embittered by the Anglo-French attack yet fearful of Russian domination. Yet it is essential for our future security to realize that our previous vacillations and policy changes had triggered the Anglo-French moves which shocked and alienated American opinion. It is important to bear in mind, too, that mere support of the UN in the specific crises of Egypt and Hungary, while it may avert war, does not of itself constitute a positive policy.

Second, then, the United States needs to infuse its future policy decisions, now presumably in the mak-

ing, with the same spirit of dedication to the purposes of the world community which was expressed when we turned to the UN in the dark hours of the breakup of the Western alliance in the Middle East. If the UN is good enough to be used as a buffer between clashing armies, is it not good enough to be used increasingly as a mechanism for channeling aid to underdeveloped countries and for expanding their trade with the advanced industrial nations? Would not the interests of the world community—as well as the United States—be better served if in the future such projects as the Aswan Dam were screened by a UN development agency instead of being used as pawns of contending great powers? Most urgent of all, should not the United States press for the creation of UN committees to study, respectively, the operation of the Suez Canal and the possible bases of a Middle East peace settlement?

And, third, we must face the fact that, as great-power blocs disintegrate, the United States will have to reconcile its military arrangements outside the UN—NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad pact and others—with the emphasis we put on the UN in the Egyptian and Hungarian crises. In this historic autumn of 1956 we learned that we cannot, in fact we dare not, act alone when the price of

failure could be nuclear war. We are no longer rigidly committed to one bloc of nations only. On some issues, such as colonialism or the development of underdeveloped countries, we may lean on the advice and support of India and other nations of the Asian-African group. On other issues we shall not want to act in isolation or defiance of the European nations, despite our present feeling of disillusionment and irritation with Britain and France.

But whatever we do, the United States must forbear from either preaching to others or ordering others about. It must also forbear from vast moralistic statements unless and until it is ready to implement such statements by concrete actions. Better silence than promises, actual or implied, on which, whatever the reason, we cannot ultimately deliver.

The UN is not ours alone. It belongs to all its members, and it is only through continuing patient and sympathetic consultation with all of them that we can hope to develop workable policies for the world community. Otherwise we shall run the danger that the UN will be unable to act—and this, in turn, could produce here a sharp reaction that would imperil the international co-operation President Eisenhower seeks.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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